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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 16/05/2006 Accident number: 149 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 11/09/1997 
Where it occurred: Pajak Village, Dehyak 
district, Ghazni 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Detection accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
bushes/scrub 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
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Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The 
following summarises its content.  
The victim was reported to have been a deminer for one month, have completed a refresher 
course six months before [note conflict] and had worked for 48 days since his last leave. The 
ground where the accident occurred was described as medium hard agricultural land with 
bushes. A photograph showed that the "bush" was sparse 18" high scrubby, multi-stemmed 
leafless plants that appeared very dry and were reported to be very difficult to cut. The 
demining group claimed to have found fragments of the device from which to identify it as a 
POMZ. 
The investigators determined that the victim did not use a tripwire feeler before using the 
detector, despite the known presence of tripwire mines. They decided that he then moved the 
detector head quickly and so pulled a tripwire with it. 
The Team Leader stated that tripwires are undetectable with a "Philips" (Schiebel AN/19) 
mine detector.  
The Section Leader stated that the tripwire was undetectable. He said the problem could be 
overcome by burning, except in this case an ammunition store was nearby so they could not 
burn.  
The victim's partner stated that the tripwire went through a "bush" so rendering it impossible 
to see. He said such areas should be burnt off. 
The victim blamed the presence of bush, and suggested that areas such as this should be 
burnt first.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the tripwire feeler was not 
used and that the failure of the command group to tell the deminer to use a tripwire feeler was 
a contributory cause. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that all Team Leaders and Section Leaders should ensure 
that deminers were fully equipped and use the equipment at appropriate times, that all 
detecting/prodding procedures should be carried out according to the established procedures, 
and that the Section Leader should "strongly advised" about his poor command and control. 
[It seems likely that tripwire feelers were not available.]  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 191 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
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Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hands 
severe Abdomen 
severe Body 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as severe fragment lacerations to both his hands, his 
chest and his lower abdomen. 
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) showed injuries concentrated on the lower torso and 
thighs, with small fragment damage on the right hand. 
 
The demining group reported that the victim had sustained serious injuries to both thighs 
when he detonated a POMZ while using a detector.  
A claim was forwarded to the insurers by the UN MAC on 23rd April 1998 saying that the 
victim suffered multiple penetrating injuries of abdomen anterior wall and posterior wall (both 
buttocks) – gluteal and sacral regions. "Some fragments (pellets) remain". The insurers were 
informed that the victim was ready to return to work on 23rd April 1998. 
No record of compensation payment was found in June 1998. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
appears to have been working incautiously and his error was not corrected. No mention is 
made of his helmet and visor, which may not have been worn.  
The investigators imply that some equipment may not have been available to the victim - from 
which it is inferred that a tripwire feeler may not have been available. This, and the failure to 
supply an adequate, working detector, is a serious failing of management. The secondary 
cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
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was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
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